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1. Introduction
The Ecosystem Information System (EIS)[1, 2, 3] is a distributed database con­
taining various types of information of interest to ecosystem modelers and man­
agers. Included in this database are m eta-data descriptions for various data sources, 
datasets, and modeling components. EIS is designed and implemented using object- 
oriented technology. The current implementation of EIS implements only the “core 
access technology” demonstrating the potential for sharing interpreted objects via 
EIS. But it does little or nothing at all in terms of security. Having come to a stage 
where the software can now be used by ecosystem modelers to populate the database 
so that it can be shared and accessed by other users on the network, data security 
has become one of the key issues. The goal of EIS is to allow users anywhere on 
the network to share distributed resources in a network-transparent manner. In a 
distributed system, sharing of data and other resources is one of the key goals. But 
while allowing users access to these resources, the distributed system should allow 
each user to do those things that he/she is authorized to do, and to prevent him /her 
from doing things that are not authorized. The work described here is the object- 
oriented design and prototype implementation of this groupware layer for EIS, as an 
extension to the current prototype system.
In this thesis, I discuss the three important aspects of the groupware layer in EIS 
and present an object-oriented design of the different classes and objects that encap­
sulate these aspects. I perform a careful study of the different popular authentication 
mechanisms available and present a viable authentication for EIS. The security mech­
anism presented here is aimed at ensuring that only the right users are allowed access 
to the database and only those services and resources that they are authorized to. 
Since authentication needs to be done for every service requested by the user, it might 
be better to cache the groupware information whenever a client is accessing a partic­
ular portion of the groupware layer. The entire design process makes use of different 
scenarios to help the designer analyse the effectiveness of a particular design aspect
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and the way to go around implementing it. The scenarios described in this thesis 
should help the reader understand the design concepts more clearly too.
Briefly summarized, the purpose of this thesis is to :
• design and implement a reliable security mechanism for a distributed system 
like EIS.
• use object-oriented methodology in the design process.
•  provide a strong authentication scheme to ensure that only the right users access 
the EIS database resources.
•  manage the costs involved in making the authentication/authorization requests.
• adopt a scenario-based object-diagram representation to describe how objects 
will interact with each other during program execution.
2. Background
2.1 An O verview  of O bject-O riented M odeling
Object-oriented design is built upon a sound engineering foundation, whose ele­
ments we collectively call the object model [4], The object model encompasses the 
principles of abstraction, encapsulation, modularity, hierarchy, concurrency, and per­
sistence. The building blocks in any object-oriented design methodology are concepts 
of class, instance(or object) and method. A class is a description of objects that 
share a common structure and a common behavior. An object is simply an instance 
of a class. An object can be considered to have state, behavior and identity. The 
state of an object is determined by a set of attributes of the object plus the current 
values of each of these attributes. In general, the internal state of an object is hid­
den from other objects and hence is not directly accessible., However an object can 
m ake parts of its state available to other objects or let other objects perform actions 
on this state through a set of visible attributes and operations. The client/server 
model is a good example of an object-oriented modelling where the two main objects 
under consideration are the client and the server processes. The client/server model 
is used to describe the use of networks containing two types of processes that have 
an asymmetric relationship. The client process makes requests for services and the 
server provides the services on request. Objects that share common attributes and 
operations are grouped into a class.
Object-Oriented design[4] is an incremental, iterative process in which the prod­
ucts o f ’design, a set of interacting objects, gently unfold over time. We start the 
object-oriented design process by discovering the classes and objects that form the 
vocabulary of our problem domain. The process of object-oriented design generally 
tracks the following order of events:
•  Identify the key abstractions in the problem space (the significant classes and 
objects) and describe the mechanisms that provide the behaviour required of
3
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objects, so that they can work together to achieve some function.
• Identify the semantics of these classes and objects.
•  Identify the relationship among these classes and objects.
• Implement these classes and objects.
This is an incremental process: the identification of new classes and objects usually 
results in the need to refine and improve upon the semantics of and relationships
among existing classes and objects. It is also an iterative process: implementing
classes and objects often leads us to the discovery or invention of new classes and 
objects whose presence simplifies and generalizes our design.
Given an object-oriented design for a target system, the next step is to somehow 
test the design, prior to implementation, to see if it provides the correct set of facil­
ities. A scenario is a description of how objects will interact with each other during 
program execution to perform a specific activity. A scenario can be represented in 
many different ways, but one of the most convenient representations is as a diagram 
showing objects and the exchange of operation calls and results that represent their 
client/server relationship in this particular scenario.
For a client/server system such as EIS, a set of carefully selected scenarios can help 
the system designer to visualize different approaches and determine the correctness 
of the design, its efficiency and how it would function in a real implementation.
2.2 Goal for EIS
Modern ecosystem management and analysis is an application area tha t demands 
extensive information sharing between different organizations and different sites within 
an organization. The goal of the EIS project is to create a network-accessible reposi­
tory of ecosystem information that provides access to various types of information of
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interest to ecosystem modelers and managers in a user-friendly manner, ensures rea­
sonable security, allows the distribution of locally created material and contribution 
from outside users, and is populated with material sufficient to illustrate both its use 
and its value to potential users. The second major goal in EIS development is to en­
hance the level of access provided by Internet-based tools for objects such as numerical 
datasets, program components and m eta-data descriptions for various data sources. 
Currently available Internet tools support the display of hypertext documents and 
images in standard formats, but provide access to other types of objects merely as 
uninterpreted files. Our goal is to develop tools that allow us to construct a web-work 
of hierarchical dataset descriptions and dataset instances, allowing a potential user to 
transparently navigate from site to site, browse through dataset descriptions, locate 
datasets and data transformations of interest, and easily add datasets and dataset 
descriptions.
2.3 O b je c t-O rie n te d  D esign  of EIS
The base EIS object-oriented design (referred to as EIS 0.9) implements the core 
of information distribution functionality, but without any access control or other 
mechanism for security. An object diagram of the EIS 0.9 design is depicted in 
Figure 1. The core system consists of five primary types of one-per-user or one-per- 
host objects that implement the necessary services. The three one-per-user objects 
G U I, O M E  an d  O R B -c lien t are encapsulated under one object called E lS -c lien t. 
ElS-client is invoked as a client process by a user. On every host, the one-per- 
host objects - O b je c t R e q u e s t B ro k e r (O R B -serv er) and O b je c t D a tab a se  
M a n ag e r  (O D B M ) are encapsulated under the E lS -se rv er. At the heart of the 
ElS-server are two one-per-host objects. The ORB-server manages locally generated 
requests, and resolves such requests by forwarding them to either the local filesystem 
or to the ORB-server on a remote host. Thus the ORB-server must also respond to 
remotely generated object requests for objects stored on its local database. The ORB-
.6
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Figure 1: EIS 0.9 Object-Oriented Design
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server also manages all communication required to store and retrieve information from 
the local file system, phrased in terms of messages/responses with the ODBM. The 
ODBM encapsulates all aspects of file system storage, thus hiding details associated 
with file naming, directory structure, etc.
The ElS-Client is a set of three one-per-user objects, namely GUI, OME and 
ORB-client. The user-interface, which involves the X/M otif details, is encapsulated 
in the GUI. The GUI maintains only enough local state to allow the display to be 
drawn. In order to allow efficient implementation of operations that modify the 
display another object, the Object Management Engine (OME), maintains a more 
complete local state. Thus, the class hierarchy is represented in different forms and 
in different degrees of detail in different objects. To maintain the local state, the 
OME uses several smaller objects which are all encapsulated in the OME for our 
explaination here. The OME routes all its requests for EIS database entities to the 
ORB-Client, which in turn forwards each request through the ORB-Server to either 
the local ODBM or across the network to another ORB-Server.
The EIS 0.9 has been implemented in C + + , with the GUI front-end written using 
X/M otif. A public-domain remote procedure call mechanism (SUN RPC) is used for 
host/host communication. This initial implementation executes on the IBM RS/6000 
Unix workstations. The code should be portable to a wide range of Unix worksta­
tions within the portatbility bounds of different C + +  compilers, X/M otif library 
implementations, and the SUN RPC. However, the prototype EIS 0.9 implements 
only the core access technology demonstrating the potential for sharing interpreted 
objects via EIS. Since the remote procedure call mechanism used is written in C, 
a encode/decode method has to be used to convert the C + +  objects into a format 
acceptable to the RPC library. All this is encapsulated within the ORB-Client and 
ORB-Server. The present implementation of EIS does not yet provide support for ro­
bust operation, group-oriented security, or other forms of access regulation. The EIS 
data-repository is organised hierarchically using an object-oriented framework to or­
der the myriad collection of components used in ecosystem modeling. In collaboration 
with other ecosystem modeling laboratories, the repository is being populated with 
datasets and modeling tools from important ecosystem modeling and management 
applications.
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3. T he Groupware Layer
3.1 R equirem ents
In a distributed system, sharing of data and other resources is one of the key goals. 
But while allowing users access to these resources, it is im portant to make sure that 
distributed system resources are accessed only by those who are authorized to do so 
and only in precisely the ways they are authorized to do so. The implementation of 
EIS has reached a stage where the database is being populated with information by 
ecosystem researchers from our collaborating laboratories. Before people start using 
EIS extensively, the primary need is to design and implement the groupware layer 
appropriate for EIS. The design of the security system for a distributed system like EIS 
is significantly different from that for a uniprocessor system. A user could be anybody 
on the network. An EIS group could consist of users from a range of hosts. The 
access privileges to a hierarchy could be more detailed than the (read, w rite , execute) 
accesses as described in the Unix system. The owner of a hierarchy should probably 
be able to specify the access groups for each/some of the groups defined. Also since 
parts of a hierarchy could be contributed by a certain group of users, they ought to 
be able to set authorization on their parts of the hierarchy for other users.
Ideally there would be a system supported layer of client/server facilities that 
allowed servers to “publish” their services yet restrict access to them, and clients to 
identify themselves and gain access to these services. The Distributed Computing 
Environment (DCE)[6] is a convenient tool for such purposes. The set of DCE Se­
curity Service facilities provides a robust set of capabilities to ensure that services 
are made available only to properly designated parties, without inconveniencing le­
gitimate users. DCE Security implementation is based on Kerberos[7, 8] and uses 
very well known encryption algorithms (Data Encryption Standard - DES). An ideal 
situation would be to implement EIS using DCE distributed support for security. But 
unfortunately, while DCE is fast becoming a standard, it is still not widely available
9
10
nor completely compatible across different vendor platforms. In order to permit the 
implementation and use of EIS now, our plan is to implement EIS using the SUN 
RPC [5] which is a public-domain software portable and compatible across a wide 
range of Unix Workstations. As regards security, the disadvantage is that the SUN 
RPC offers an authentication scheme which cannot provide a high level of security 
for an arbitrary design. The complete functional design of EIS demands this level 
of security for its groupware scheme. The work described here includes the complete 
EIS groupware design, and a modified, more limited form that can be implemented 
securely with only RPC support.
There are three facets of the proposed groupware layer: authentication, autho­
rization, and access control. The three “As” work together to provide security in 
EIS. Authentication means validating the user’s identity. Authorization means deter­
mining to what groups this user belongs. Access control is deciding the set of access 
privileges this user should and should not be allowed. The authorization and access 
control decisions in the EIS distributed system are encapsulated in the ElS-server. 
For every operation that a user requests, the ElS-client authenticates the user (deter­
mines the user’s identity), authorizes the user’s membership, then verifies from the 
concerned ElS-server if the user has the right to perform the access implied by the 
requested service. Only at the end of this process is the user allowed to perform the 
requested action.
There is overhead in making authentication/authorization/access requests. In 
general, information required to resolve these requests may be stored globally, so the 
overhead is passed along to the concerned ElS-server. If the server is remote from the 
originating user, considerable performance delays could result. Since such requests 
are made for every operation requested by the client, the groupware layer is likely to 
be the most frequently used resource in EIS.
There are three major issues to be addressed in the groupware implementation.
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First is managing the costs involved in resolving the 3-A requests. Second is rec­
ognizing the level of security and functionality that can be attained without true 
distributed system support for security, i.e. using only RPC. The third is balancing 
communication and data replication in the design of features to support the 3-A’s. 
Keeping only a single copy of the pertinent groupware data will lead to excessive 
communication costs, whereas replicating the data at each client might lead to an 
inconsistency between the replicated groupware data thereby leading , to erroneous 
results. An appropriate balance between centralized and replication schemes, as de­
scribed in [9, 10], must be designed to make the 3-A implementation efficient, reliable 
and robust.
Actually integrating a well thought-out groupware layer with the existing system 
code will be the final step. All of the new objects are encapsulated within the server, 
only requiring changes in the ORB-client and ORB-server to handle the communica­
tion requests and minor new GUI capability for operations concerning the groupware 
layer. We shall identify this new EIS system with the groupware layer with a new 
version number (EIS 1.0) in order to distinguish the new EIS from the existing system 
(EIS 0.9).
3.2 B asic E ntities
Logically, the groupware layer is based on a collection of classes that define the 
characteristics of active entities such as users, hosts, and groups, of permissions, and 
of privileges. These classes are defined below, followed by a discussion on the pro­
cedure used in EIS 1.0 in handling the 3-A aspects of Authentication, Authorization 
and Access Control. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the classes that encapsulate these def­
initions. Figure 2 describes the abstractions that encapsulate concepts related to 
authentication and authorization. Figure 3 is a description of the abstractions that 
encapsulate key concepts in defining access permissions. Figure 4 shows the different 
classes of users in the EIS system, based on their access privileges. A single instance
12
of groupJnfo will encapsulate the authentication and authorization operations for a 
group of hosts. An instance of privJnfo  will encapsulate the permissions for different 
groups for each hierarchy, and hence is used for access control.
Figure 5 also suggests where the different parts of the groupware layer fit into the 
EIS system. Logically, the EIS system as a whole consists of a number of cells. Each 
cell in made up of a set of hosts. Ideally a host belongs within only one cell but it 
can be otherwise. One host in each cell is designated as the cell’s mainserver  which 
is very much like the other EIS servers except that it encapsulates the groupJnfo and 
the hierJdJist for that cell. The groupJnfo defines a set of groups for the cell and the 
scope of a group includes all the hosts within the cell. Every EIS host maintains a 
database of all the hierarchies that were created on that host. For example, in Figure 
5, the hierarchies H I E R m i indicates that this hierarchy is one of the hierarchies 
stored on host M. Hierarchies are identified by names that are unique within the 
domain of a cell. Along with each hierarchy, we have a privJnfo object that keeps 
track of the access permissions for different groups to the hierarchy.
3 .3 A n E x a m p le  groupJnfo O b jec t
An example instance of groupJnfo is shown in Figure 6 to better illustrate how 
the objects are organized. Cell A is one of the cells in the EIS system as depicted in 
Figure 5. The groupJnfo consists of:
1. A list of groups (EIS-ADMIN, dasl, eis) and the users belonging to each of these 
groups
2. A list of vita with a cross reference indicating the list of groups each user belongs 
to.
This instance of groupJnfo for cell A is encapsulated within the mainserver  for the 
cell, host “cs.umt.edu”. Suppose now, user “trish@radiator.cs.umt.edu” creates a hi-
Class
user
host
cell
group
v ita
group _info
E IS-server  
m ain_server
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A ttrib u tes D escription
email-id Since EIS can be accessed from anywhere on the network, 
we define a EIS user as a person with a valid email account 
on a Unix system. Hence a user’s attribute is the 
email-id of the account.
IP address An EIS host is a host on which an EIS server
runs as a daemon process.
list< host> A cell in EIS terms is a group of co-operating EIS hosts, each
running its own EIS server. Each cell has a designated mainserver 
host which has the extra attributes described below.
group-name,
list<user>
user,
list<group>
eis _admin,
list<group>,
list<vita>
Hierarchies
A group encapsulates a group _name and a list of users 
that belong to the group.
A vita is defined as the list of groups that a user belongs to.
It consists of a user attribute and a list<groups attribute.
This contains the information describing which user belongs 
to each group and what groups each user belongs to. This 
object encapsulates the authorization process of the groupware 
layer. The list<vita> is a cross-reference to the list<group> so 
that the authorization process is faster and more efficient.
There should be only one groupJnfo object per EIS cell.
This is the EIS server process that runs as a one-per-host daemon 
process. It handles requests from EIS clients and manages the databas
Hierarchies, 
hierarchy-list, 
groupJnfo
The mainserver in a cell is different from the other 
EIS servers in that it encapsulates a few additional objects that 
are absent in other servers. These attributes are the groupJnfo and 
hierarchyJist{a table of all the hierarchies within the cell).
Figure 2: Abstractions encapsulating Authentication/Authorization
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Class A ttrib u tes
p riv Jn fo  owner-id, owner_perms,
world_perms, list<group_perms>
perm s read, modify, modify Jf_extended,
D escrip tion
PrivJnfo is the object that keeps access 
right information for different privilege 
classes.
This object contains the different
delete, deleteJd.extended, extend, execute access rights defineable in a EIS hierarchy, 
g ro u p .p erm  groupname, perms The permissions for a group.
Figure 3: Abstractions encapsulating Access Control
C lass A ttr ib u tes and description
Privilege Classes The Privilege classes within EIS are EIS_Admin[Root], Owner, 
Group(s), World. The EIS J\.dmin is the only class of user(s) who are privileged to ac­
cess/modify the groupJnfo Every hierarchy has a Owner who can change/add/delete 
the permission attribute of any of the groups. Each of the different groups including 
the world can be set to have different access rights.
Figure 4: Privilege Classes
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Figure 5: EIS Object-oriented diagram including the Groupware Layer
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EIS.ADMIN: venu@eisgate.cs.umt.edu, vijayant@eisgate.cs.umt.edu 
dasl: ford@cs.umt.edu, trish@radiator.cs.umt.edu, ford@wilfred.umt.edu 
eis: righter@wru.umt.edu, dthompsn@cs.umt.edu , ford@wilfred.umt.edu
venu@eisgate.cs.umt.edu: EIS-ADMIN 
vijayant@eisgate.cs.umt.edu: EIS-ADMIN 
ford@cs.umt.edu: dasl 
ford@wilfred.umt.edu: dasl, eis 
dthompsn@cs.umt.edu: eis 
trish@radiator.cs.umt.edu: dasl 
righter@wru.umt.edu: eis
/* a group */ 
/* a group */ 
/* a group */
/* a vita 7
r a vita 7
r a vita 7
/*a vita 7
r a vita 7
r a vita */
/* a vita 7
Figure 6: An example groupJnfo instance for cell A
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G roup N am e P erm issions
owner < trish@r adiat or. cs. umt .edu > r d-m-ex
eis r—-ex
world r------
Figure 7: PrivJnfo for hierarchy habitat-type
erarchy named habitat-type on host “radiator.cs.umt.edu”. Then “trish@radiator.cs.umt.edu” 
becomes the owner of hierarchy “habitat-type” . Either the owner or the EIS-ADMIN 
can specify access permissions to “habitat_type” for different groups. An example 
privJnfo  for “habitat_type” is as shown in Figure 7.
3.4 EIS D atabase Organization
In this section, we discuss scenarios that illustrate the client/server (object) in­
teraction used to implement the basic services provided in EIS. These scenarios are 
im portant because they help to illustrate the database organization and reflect upon 
the way the groupware authentication is designed.
Consider some cell C, in which the main.server is Sm • The mainserver S m  con­
tains a “hierarchy list” which maintains a list of all hierarchies created within the cell 
domain. For every hierarchy that is created, there is a minJnfo  object that maintains 
links to all the classes, instances and methods that together form the hierarchy. The 
minJnfo  is encapsulated in the database on the host where the hierarchy was origi­
nally created. That is when a new hierarchy “H i” is created, its minJnfo  is
stored on the local host’s database and a link to the hierarchy’s minJnfo  “771:rnm” is 
planted in the “hierarchy list” maintained on the mainserver  for the cell. Individual
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User X
Host L
Client C
/ \
Server S|_
1. Save mindnfo  for hierarchy Hi
2. Server Sl  records the mindnfo  for H\ in its database
3. Server S l requests Sm  to add a link to Hi in the hierarchy list
4. & 5. return ACK.
Figure 8: Create and Save a Hierarchy Hi
class, instance and method definitions that are subsequently added to the hierarchy 
are encapsulated on the host where they are created. Everytime a class, instance or 
method is defined that extends a hierarchy, the object’s description (called maxdnfo 
for the object) is stored on the local database. A link to the object’s maxdnfo along 
with some minimal information about the relationship of this object with other ob­
jects in the hierarchy is planted in the hierarchy’s mindnfo Thus whenever
a new object is defined on host L for a hierarchy originally created on host K, the ob­
ject definition is stored on L and a link to this definition is created in the hierarchy’s 
mindnfo  object on host K.
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erY
Host A Host L
User X
Client C|_Client Ci/ \ / \
Server S|_Server S^
1. Store the maxJnfo  for the new class on the local database.
2. Add a link to the minJnfo  of H\ on host L’s database.
3. & 4. return ACK.
Figure 9: Extend a Subclass to hierarchy H\
Figure 8 depicts the scenario where user X on host L creates a hierarchy H\. The 
client Cl makes a request to its local server S i  to save the minJnfo  for Hi on host 
L. The server also connects to the cell main server, Sm , to update the cell hierarchy 
list to add a link to the new hierarchy H \ .
Figure 9 describes a scenario where another user Y on some other host A adds a 
subclass to the hierarchy H\. At the time of executing this service request, the user 
would have already loaded the minJnfo  for Hi. When the user adds the new subclass, 
a request is sent to Sa to add the maxJnfo  for the extended class on 5Vs database. 
Subsequently, Sa sends a request “add a link to the new class” to the server “5V'\ 
which will update the minJnfo  for H \ .
4. T he 3-A  A sp ects  o f  th e  Groupware Layer
4.1 U ser A uthentication
Authentication is a process of verifying a user’s identity. Authentication is the 
foundation of groupware security. Only if we can be sure of who we are talking 
to can any other security features be of any value. Authentication is the groupware 
mechanism most different from mechanisms used in monolithic systems, and the most 
complex part of the groupware layer. Hence a careful study of the authentication 
process in the EIS groupware is essential. The problem we need to solve is to guarantee 
that the EIS design and implementation satisfies following conditions:
• No activity by a rogue process (user/server/m ain server) should corrupt the 
database of any EIS server.
•  No activity by a rogue process should plant a link in a valid database that 
when subsequently accessed allows the rogue to obtain rights or privileges on
. the requestor, or to corrupt data on the requestor.
A couple of popular solutions possible in the UNIX client/server domain are ex­
plained here. We shall later discuss the viable alternatives for authentication in EIS 
in section 4.2. In a network environment, it is difficult to determine the exact iden­
tity  of a user on a remote host. In most client/server implementations of processes 
such as “rlogin” or “rsh”, the client and server code on a host are owned by the root 
user of the host. The “rlogin” command logs a user into a specific remote host and 
attem pts to connect the user initiating the rlogin request to the remote host. The 
“rsh” command attem pts to execute the specified command on the remote host on 
behalf of the user initiating the request. Both “rlogin” and “rsh” are client/server 
implementations where the server runs as a daemon process waiting for client requests 
and the client is executed whenever a user issues the command. A user on a host 
can tell the rlogin and rsh daemons to allow some users log into their accounts di­
rectly without prompting them for a password while preventing all other users from
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logging in without entering the correct password. The client code can be executed by 
any normal user. A user executing this code temporarily becomes “root” , and thus 
temporarily gains privileges allowing the execution of root operations like reading 
kernel files or binding the client to a reserved socket port. However it is important 
to note that it is the process executing this code that gains “root” privileges though 
it is executed by any normal user. Hence as long as the integrity of the executable 
allowing temporary root privileges is guaranteed, we can ensure that a normal user 
cannot do anything rogueish.
The authentication mechanism explained here pertains to the implementation 
used in standard Unix Network software such as “rlogin”. A detailed study of the 
implementation of Unix Network Programming is discussed in [8]. When a socket 
connection is established by the client with a remote server, the server can request 
the port and machine address of the live connection1. Since only root processes 
can bind to a reserved socket port, the server process can verify if the connection is 
established with a client process that has root privileges on a trusted host. A rogue 
can modify the client code and try to do something rogish. However if the rogue is 
not root, the rogue’s code will not have root privileges and hence will not be able to 
bind to a reserved socket port. In such a protocol, there is a potential problem since 
the server must trust the root on a remote site. This is quite acceptable since the 
client can do nothing to harm the server host as long as the client is not granted the 
unusual privileges by the server (in the rlogin example, the “.rhosts” file determines 
a  remote client’s privileges).
The authentication mechanism explained in the above paragraph cannot be adopted 
into EIS for the following reasons. Since EIS is still in a  developmental stage, it is 
arguably better not to install the EIS client and server code as root processes with 
full root privileges (most often, the servers are the entry-points for Internet rogues.).
1The Unix system call getp eern am eQ  returns the foreign machine’s IP address and the port 
number to which the foreign process is connected
22
Since the source code for EIS is to be freely distributed, trusting the client process 
could be disastrous. An alternative would be to use the information provided by the 
id e n t facility to identify the owner of each client process requesting server access. As 
per the RFC 931 protocol, id en t provides a reasonably good way of authenticating a 
user. It requires that both machines engaged in the client/server connection must run 
the identity daemon id e n td  process in the background. The server upon receiving 
requests from a client, then connects to the identd daemon on the host where the 
client process is running to verify the user’s identity.
Unfortunately there are problems with ident which make it unacceptable for use 
in authentication in EIS. Firstly, the identd daemon has to be a root process, since it 
reads kernel files (/dev/km em ) to determine which user is connected to a given port. 
As such it should be started by the inetd daemon. Secondly, there is a significant 
amount of communication overhead (end_server identd daemon) needed just for 
authentication purposes. Also while identd works to authenticate local/remote re­
quests, it does not help local host authentication in any way. Finally, use of ident is 
gaining popularity, but it is still not an accepted standard and hence not all systems 
support it yet. To simulate identd functionality within the EIS server process is also 
not possible since the process would need to read kernel files which are readable only 
by the root.
4.2 A u th e n tic a tio n  in EIS
As depicted in Figure 1, an EIS server interacts directly with either clients on the 
same host or another server on a remote host which issues requests on behalf of some 
client on that host. Given such a situation, the problem is to identify appropriate 
methods to verify the trustworthiness of a remote server and a local client so as to 
ensure the validity of the conditions described above.
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4.2.1 Local C lient A uthentication
In EIS, a client directly connects to the server on its host for every request it 
needs processed. As long as we assume that the server on that host is trustworthy, 
this helps us in the authentication process. W ith every request generated by the client 
that needs authentication, the EIS client determines the user’s identity arid passes it 
to the local server, which verifies the validity of the user information by looking in 
the local process table. Since the client/server connection pertains to the same host, 
external “spoofing” can be ruled out. This authentication method of a local client 
process helps identify exactly the user issuing the client request and hence satisfies 
the conditions set forth above in this section.
4 .2 .2  R em ote Server A uthentication
Remote server authentication is more difficult to attain in the EIS system because 
of the following reasons:
1. Neither the SUN RPC nor the socket system calls provide any means of iden­
tifying the caller user’s identity. There are provisions to determine the remote 
host’s IP address and the port to which the caller is connected; However it is 
not possible to determine who the calling user is.
2. EIS 0.9 should not be run as a root process, and hence cannot take advantage 
authentication mechanisms that require root access.
3. The ultim ate goal is to use a DCE-based implementation to provide a reliable 
security mechanism. EIS should not be based on elaborate ad hoc solutions in 
the interim.
Since our main aim is to ensure that no operation by any user of EIS 1.0 corrupts 
the database in any way, the following approach is suggested:
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• All EIS administrators must be valid users on the mainserver  of the cell. We 
restrict certain EIS admin operations, so that all admin-related operations (cre­
a te /re m o v e  a  g ro u p , a d d /d e le te  u sers  from  a g roup) must be requested 
from the mainserver.
• Any user who is authorized with re ad , e x te n d /e x e c u te  privileges on a hierar­
chy can read the hierarchy. In order to delete/modify a subclass/instance/method, 
the user must not only have the right privileges, but must also execute the 
delete/modify commands from the same host on which the objects were created 
(i.e. the user has to be “local” to that host).
• No user from some host can effect a delete/modify operation on an object created 
on some other host, even though the user belongs to a group tha t is authorized 
with delete/modify privileges.
• For all other services requested by a remote user, EIS will normally trust the 
authentication information received from the remote host and cross-check only 
to verify the host IP address of the connecting client.
As explained in section 4.2.1, we can authenticate with certainty any user on the 
local host. However, when a request is made across the network, the system is more 
vulnerable to external spoofing and the different alternatives discussed earlier fail to 
ensure a sure-proof authentication mechanism. The above approach takes the firm 
stance of limiting the access privileges of outside users and simply denies outside 
users the right to delete/modify classes/instances/methods, because such operations 
can affect the local database. Yet, this does not mean that we are over-protective 
of the database information. For most services available in EIS, we normally tru s t2 
the authentication information provided by the remote server. Any user with the 
appropriate access can request and use “read & extend” services normally. The
2We still check the socket connection to verify the IP address of the host the server is connected
to.
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extra precautions in the case of modify/delete services are used to ensure that only 
the “right” persons modify local databases. This approach also avoids extensive 
performance penalty for authentication, since there are no repeated calls back and 
forth just for authentication purposes.
W ith this authentication scheme, we control “write” access to the database. How­
ever, a rogue user can still extend objects to a hierarchy or an entire hierarchy to a 
system that had no business being there. Under normal circumstances, we can assume 
that everything runs ok and that an EIS user has no malicious intent. But there are 
several issues we need to consider more carefully.
1. An EIS Administrator controls EIS information on a cell (a group of hosts). 
Suppose some rogue user creates a hierarchy Hi on some host B in the cell. The ad­
ministrator sitting on the mainserver's  host M is an external user to any information 
on host B and hence has limited access to the hierarchy Hi on host B. We noted in 
section 3.4 that the main.server maintains links to all the hierarchies (called hierar­
chy list) created within the cell it encapsulates. Any user who wishes to open/use a 
hierarchy has to first retrieve this hierarchy list and traverse the link to the appro­
priate hierarchy. As a solution to the above problem, the Administrator can choose 
to remove the link to the hierarchy Hi from the hierarchy list and control the user’s 
access rights to the cell.
2. Another problem occurs when a rogue user extends objects to a hierarchy cre­
ated by some other user. The owner of the hierarchy has the access rights to decide 
who can extend objects to the hierarchy and who cannot. But as in the previ­
ous case, if an object is already extended by a rogue user on some other host, the 
owner of the hierarchy cannot remove these objects physically from the database 
since now he is not a trusted user on the other host. Again, the solution in this case 
is similar to the one discussed for the previous problem. W ith every hierarchy, we 
m aintain an object called minJnfo  which resides on the database of the host where
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the hierarchy was created. The minJnfo  object maintains links to all the different 
classes/instances/methods extended to the hierarchy, along with some minimal infor­
mation of how the classes/instances/methods relate to one another in the hierarchy. 
Every tim e someone extends a class/instance/method to a hierarchy, the information 
the object carries is stored on the local database of the host where the object was cre­
ated and a link to the object information is placed in the minJnfo  object. The owner 
of the hierarchy controls the minJnfo  object though he has no control to the physical 
information of the extended object. He could remove the link to the extended object. 
This could get complicated when a scenario given in Figure 10 develops. Classes C l, 
C2 and C3 are valid classes added to hierarchy i / 2- Now a rogue user extends a class 
C4 and instance II to the class C3 as shown in the figure. If later some other user 
extends a class C5 to C4, then removing the link to C4 becomes non-trivial since it 
has some valid sub-class(es) C5 which should still continue to exist. Here the owner of 
the hierarchy can choose to either hide just C4 and II so that they are not accessible 
by any user, or remove the sub-tree starting at node C4 so that links to all objects 
in the sub-tree are lost, or move the sub-class C5 to some safe parent class and then 
remove the links to C4 and II.
4.3 A uthorization
As we explained earlier when defining the groupware classes and objects, the ob­
ject that encapsulates the authorization process in EIS is groupJnfo. Authorization is 
a process of determining the different groups the user belongs to. Once the authenti­
cation procedure is done correctly, to authorize a user, we have to make a connection 
to the mainserver  of the cell3. The mainserver  requests its group Jnfo  object to 
return a list of groups to which the user is a member.
3If a copy of the cell’s group Jnfo  already exists on this site, then this process is much simpler
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instance 11
Class C1
Class C4
Class C5
Class C3Class C2
Class C4 and Instance II exhibit ‘rogue-ish’ behaviour.
Solutions:
1. Hide the sub-tree rooted at Class C4.
2. Delete the sub-tree rooted at Class C4. Implication of 1 & 2: Valid class C5 is 
not accessible anymore.
3. Make Class C3 the parent of C5 and delete the sub-tree now rooted a,t Class 
C4.
Figure 10: An example rogueish behaviour
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4.4 Access Control
Access Control is a per-hierarchy operation. A group can have different access 
privileges to different hierarchies within a cell. Each hierarchy encapsulates the object 
(priv-info) th a t keeps of the permissions for different groups. After determining the 
different groups for a user, we look up the privJnfo4 object to verify each group’s 
permissions to the hierarchy. The user’s access rights are a union of the access rights 
of all the groups to which he belongs.
4The privJnfo  object physically exists on the host where the hierarchy was created.
5. Scenarios
We shall use a scenario-based examination to see how the groupware layer fits into 
the EIS system. A scenario is a description of how objects interact with each other 
while performing a specific activity. A scenario can be represented in many different 
ways, but one of the most convenient representations is as a diagram showing objects 
and the exchange of operation calls/value returns. Such a diagram represents the 
client/server relationship in this particular scenario.
5.1 N otation s
We shall adopt the following notational convention in describing the scenarios:
Client C n ' The EIS client process 1 on host I
Server S i : The EIS server process (one per host) on host I
Sm - The designated mainserver iov the concerned cell
Sr : A remote server in the cell from which a hierarchy is
being retrieved.
L: The local host from where the user is operating.
The arrows in the scenario-based diagrams indicate that the object pointed to is being 
requested for a resource/action by the object from where the arrow is originating. We 
also denote the sequence of events by marking the arrows with numbers. For example, 
an event marked 3 occurs earlier than one marked 5. The exact action that occurs on 
the event is shown separately at the bottom of the diagram, referenced by the event 
number. The sections below discuss the finer points of the scenarios depicted in the 
figures.
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5.2 B asic D esign
In all the scenarios presented in this section, every request involving remote data 
access generated by a client on some host L is sent first to the server S l on the same 
host, then subsequently from Sl to the remote server. There are a few advantages 
of passing requests through the local server Sl rather than having the client connect 
directly to the remote server. The first advantage is that the server on the same 
machine can verify if the client caller is really the user that he claims to be. This 
helps ‘strengthen’ the authentication process against users trying to spoof the system. 
Secondly, the local server can be designed to maintain a cache of remote group Jnfo  and 
privJnfo  objects that are frequently accessed. Group Jnfo  and privJnfo are the objects 
most frequently accessed within the EIS system and such a cache could dramatically 
reduce network loading and on remote servers. Caching this information at the local 
server whenever necessary helps speed further accesses to these objects while at the 
same time not compromising on security by preventing the client direct access to this 
information.
Unfortunately, although caching group Jnfo  and privJnfo at different servers where 
they are being used greatly helps in reducing network traffic, it also introduces some 
problems. The first and most important of these relates to authentication. By caching 
groupware information on a remote host, we are trusting a remote server to provide a 
valid authentication. This works as long as the remote server is trustworthy. But the 
remote server could also be a rogue that provides false information. The authentica­
tion scheme presented in section 4.2 tells not to trust a remote user or server when 
any service with write or modify privileges is requested. The authentication scheme 
restricts write and modify services to only privileged users on the local host. Thus we 
are not forced (or allowed) to trust remote servers.
Another problem relates to consistency and concurrency issues. Appropriate steps 
need to be taken in order to maintain consistency between the different copies of a
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replicated object whenever the object is updated at any of the sites. The scenarios 
that follow deal with these issues and propose a method of dealing with the consistency 
issues.
5.2.1 C reate a Group
A scenario for group creation is shown in Figure 11. We assume that the domain 
of this operation is restricted to the current cell under consideration. In order to 
perform this operation, the user has to be the EIS Administrator for the cell. As we 
discussed earlier in section 4.2, an EIS Administrator has to be a valid login account 
on the mainserver  of the cell. This way, the authentication is fool-proof. The scenario 
indicates the order in which the authentication/authorization routines are performed. 
The EIS client C l i  identifies the user performing the action and sends the request to 
the server on its machine Sl - The server Sl verifies that the requestor is really the 
person he claims to be. This is the authentication process. An outline of the algorithm 
used to verify the user’s identity is shown in Figure 1 in appendix A. The server checks 
to see if server Sl is the mainserver  itself. Since the authentication verifies if the 
client C l i  was running on the same host L, this check helps determine if the client 
Cli is running on the mainserver. The mainserver  then looks up the group.info 
object in its database to see if the user is an administrator. This is the authorization 
process. If the authorization process returns a positive acknowledgement, only then 
is the newly created group is effected on the group Jnfo  object in the database.
5.2.2 O pen a Hierarchy
Figure 12 illustrates execution of the “Get-Hierarchy” operation. S r  is the server 
on the site where the hierarchy is stored. Server Sm  is the mainserver  of the cell 
including host R. The OME object in the client C l i  has knowledge of where the 
requested hierarchy exists on the network. Cli sends a request to its local server Sl
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C lien t Cj_
Server Sl
1. Create_Group(myid, A)
2. if authenticate(myid) then  /* verify if the userid myid is local and valid */
if Sl = Sm  then
if myid = admin and group A does not exist already then  
begin
create_group(A); 
ack = OK; 
return(ack);
end
ack = PERMISSION-DENIED; 
return(ack);
3 . return(ack);
Figure 11: Scenario: Create a Group
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Server S.
Client C|̂
Server S^Server S
1. Get_Hierarchy(uid, HIER, R)
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK th en  /* verify if the userid myid is local and valid */
if group Jnfo and HIER.privJnfo copies exist in the cache then 
if authorize(uid, READ) = OK then
/* forward request to host R to retrieve hierarchy’s minJnfo */ 
Get_Hierarchy(uid, HIER, R); 
else return PERMISSION-DENIED; 
else Get_Hierarchy(uid, HIER, R);
3. if verify_client_host(uid.host_address) = OK then
groupJnfo = get-groupJnfo(M);
4. /* Server Sm  notes that server Sl will keep a copy of groupJnfo */ 
group Jnfo. sit e-list .add (L);
re t urn(group Jnfo);
5. if authorize(uid, READ) = OK then 
begin
/* Server Sr  notes that server Sl will keep a copy of HIER.privJnfo */ 
HIER.privJnfo.siteJist.add(L); 
return(minJnfo, groupJnfo, HIER.privJnfo); 
end
else return PERMISSION-DENIED;
6. HIER.priv Jnfo.site = R; /* Server Sl notes the site of the original copies */ 
groupJnfo.site = M;
copy groupJnfo and HIER.privJnfo on local database;
7. return(minJnfo);
Figure 12: Scenario: Open a hierarchy ‘HIER’
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passing as arguments the requesting user’s identification, the name of the hierarchy 
requested and the site from where to receive the hierarchy. The local server first 
executes the authentication algorithm to verify the user’s identity. The local server 
then tries to determine if the groupware information for the hierarchy already exists in 
the cache. If a reference is found, the client is authorized and his access control verified 
at the locaLserver. If the authorization/access_control operations fail to validate the 
user, then a negative acknowledgement is sent back to the user immediately and the 
service request ignored. If however, the user passes the authorization test on the 
locaLserver or there is no groupware information stored in the cache, the request is 
forwarded to the remote server S r . S r  requests its mainserver  to authorize the user 
(determine all the groups to which the user belongs). S r  then checks if any of these 
groups are privileged with read permissions on the hierarchy. If so, the appropriate 
information is returned to the user (in this case, the minJnfo  for the hierarchy). Even 
if the client passes the authentication and access control test on its local server from 
the groupware information stored in the cache, a cross-verification is done by the 
server on the hosts where the actual database exists. Also notice that the groupJnfo 
that originally existed on server Sm  and a copy of privJnfo for the hierarchy HIER 
whose original copy exists on server S r  are copied on server S r . The local server S l 
keeps track of the respective sites from where the copies were obtained. Also, the 
sites that store the original copies note down that server S l  now has a copy of their 
data.
5.2 .3  A dd an O bject to  the Hierarchy
This scenario continues the scenario shown in Figure 12. Having opened a hierar­
chy, the user now tries to add an object to the hiearchy. The user is first checked for 
extend privileges to the hierarchy. The scenario in Figure 13 explains how caching the 
protection-related information helps in improving system performance. The request 
for authentication is sent to the local server for authentication and authorization. If
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Client C
Server SL Server Sr
Add Obiectfobi. parent)
1. HIER.Add_Object(uid, Obj, ParentObj);
2. /* Authentication performed on groupJnfo and HIER.privJnfo in the cache */ 
if authenticate(uid) != OK then
return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
, store_maxJnfo(Obj); /* Add Obj’s maxJnfo to local database */
3. HIER.addJink(uid, Obj, ParentObj); /* Request Sr  to place a link to the new object */
4. if authorize(uid) != OK then
return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
HIER.addJink(Obj, ParentObj); 
return(OK);
5. &: 6. return(ACK);
Figure 13: Scenario: Add object ‘Obj’ to object ‘ParentO bj’
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the user is denied the access rights to extend to the hierarchy, control is immediately 
returned to the calling process. It is in situations like these that a cache greatly 
helps in reducing network traffic. However, caching of information could leave holes 
in the authentication process. Hence a more careful approach is adopted. Suppose in 
this case, the authentication performed based on the information in the cache goes 
through successfully, then the newly extended object is added to the local database. 
This does not lead to any penalty on the remote database5 encapsulated by S r  in 
terms of disk space. However, for every object in the hierarchy, a link has to be placed 
in the hierarchy’s minJn fo  on server S r . In order to cross-verify that the server S l 
was not spoofing, when a request to place a link to the newly extended object is sent 
to the server S r , the authentication process is carried out again before placing the 
link. Though this authentication means extra CPU cycles on host R in most cases, 
it helps to make sure that the some remote rogue process is not placing a link in the 
hierarchy that does not need to be there.
5 .2 .4  D e le te  an  O b jec t from  th e  H ie ra rch y
This scenario is slightly different from the “Add Object” scenario because of the 
way authentication is done differently for delete and extend  services. Suppose an 
object “A” is created on some host R. i.e. the maxJnfo  for the object “A” exists on 
the database on host R. The authentication mechanism restricts the delete privileges 
to only those users on the same host R that have delete privileges to the hierarchy. 
A user on some other host, say L, can n o t delete (or modify) the object “A” even 
though they could belong to a group that has the required privileges to the hierarchy.
For example, let a group G\ contain users “X@R” and “Y@L” where X and Y are 
valid user accounts on hosts R and L respectively. If group G\ has delete privileges 
to the hierarchy, then the object “A” can be deleted by user “X@R” because he is
5 where the actual hierarchy exists
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Client C,
©
HIER.Delete Obiectfuid. A)
1. HIER.Delete_Object(uid, A); /* send request to local server */
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK then
/* check if the request is coming from a client on the same host */
if Cm- host .address = 5#.host_address then
begin
HIER.delete_object(A);
return(OK);
end
return(PERMISSIONJDENIED);
3. return(ACK);
Figure 14: Scenario: Delete Object “A” from hierarchy “HIER”
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a privileged user on the same host R where the maxJnfo of the object exists. User 
“Y@L” cannot delete the object “A” even though he is a privileged user because he 
is a remote user with respect to the object “A” .
5.2.5 A dd a group to  a hierarchy
Groups for a hierarchy are encapsulated in a one-per-hierarchy object called 
privJnfo. A group can be added to or deleted from a hierarchy only by the owner 
of the hierarchy. Every group for a hierarchy has a set of privileges to the hierarchy. 
Refer to Figure 7 for an example privJnfo object for a hierarchy. In order to add 
a group to a hierarchy, the group must already be defined in the cell domain. The 
example privJnfo  in Figure 7 is for a hierarchy “habitat_type” that is encapsulated 
within the cell “A” . The groups defined on the cell “A” as given in Figure 6 are 
“admin”, “dasl” and “eis” . If the owner of the hierarchy “habitat_type” tries to add 
a group “wsal” to the hierarchy, then the operation should fail since the group “wsal” 
is undefined.
Assume that the scenario in Figure 15 occurs when some user on host P and some 
user on host Q have obtained a copy of the hierarchy “HIER” under consideration. 
Then a copy of the groupJnfo and privJnfo for “HIER” reside on the databases 
encapsulated by Sp. and S q . So whenever an update operation is done on any of these 
copies (including the original copy), the update operation has to be effected on all 
other copies of groupJnfo and privJnfo  for “HIER” in order to maintain consistency.
In this scenario, the client Cli directly requests the local server Sl for the con­
cerned service. In chapter 3, we saw that the minJnfo  for a hierarchy resides on 
the database of the host where it was created. So the owner of the hierarchy should 
be a valid login account on the host where the minJnfo  for the hierarchy is stored. 
Following this logic, the server Sl makes a check to see if the server Sl is the same as 
S r , the site of the database for the hierarchy. If not, the user is denied access to the
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Client C
Server S p
Server (-% )
© © Server Sq
0
1. Add_Group_to_Hier(uid, G \ , HIER); /* client request to local server */
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK then
/* check if request is from a local client and if the server Sl is the site of HIER */ 
if Cl i - host -address = 5^.host-address and Sl = Sr  then
/* add group to HIER.privJnfo in the database with the appropriate permissions */ 
HIER.add_group_to_hier((ji, (7i.perms); 
else return(PERMISSION-DENIED); 
else return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
3. send update.privinfo(HIER, new_privJnfo) request to servers Sp  and Sq
4 .  HIER.privJnfo.update(new.privJnfo); /* update cache copies of HIER.privJnfo */
5. return(ACK);
Figure 15: Scenario: Add group “G i” to hierarchy “HIER”
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“add_group_to_hier” service to the hierarchy. It is possible that a rogue process on 
some host directly connect to S r  rather than to the local host. A Unix daemon pro­
cess does not treat requests from local processes differently from those from remote 
processes. The getpeername system call however helps identify the calling process’s 
host address. By making sure that the calling process has the same host address as 
the server process, we can thus ensure that the calling process is local to the host.
On successful authentication, the group G\ is added to the hierarchy’s privJnfo 
on server S l (In this case, the local server S l is the server S r  on which the hierarchy’s 
minJnfo  exists). Then an update request is sent to each server (Sp and Sq)  that keep 
a copy of the privJnfo  object. It is important to note that the copies of groupJnfo 
and privJnfo  are writeable only by the server that owns the original copy and not 
by any other. This is because only the owner of a hierarchy has write access to the 
privJnfo  object for the hierarchy and only the EIS administrator has write access to 
the groupJnfo object for a cell. The local server that caches this information has only 
read access to the copy it owns. Any write operation on these objects performed on 
a copy does not affect the original copy.
5.2.6 A dd a user to a group
This scenario is conceptually similar to the “add_group_to_hier” scenario described 
in section 5.2.5. The main difference between these two scenarios is that this scenario 
is a groupJnfo related operation while the previous scenario was a privJnfo  related 
scenario. And since the groupJnfo resides on the mainserver, and this operation 
requests the write privilege to the groupJnfo object, the requests to this operation 
has to originate on the mainserver  and the EIS Administrator for the cell is the 
only authorized user to this operation. The approach followed in the scenario is 
otherwise similar to what has been described earlier. Note again that the cache 
copies of groupJnfo that exist on different hosts are writeable only via a request from 
the m ainserver  of the cell. All other processes (the local client processes), use this
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Server SL(=sM)
© Server SQ
1. Add_User_to_Group(uid, U\, Gi); /* client request to local server */
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK then
/* check if request is from a local client and if the local server Sl is also the mainserver Sm  */ 
if Cxi.host_address = Sl -host .address and Sl = Sm  then
/* add user Ui to group G\ in the group-info object of the cell */ 
group Jnfo.add_user_to_group(U\ , G\ ); 
else return(PERMISSION_DENIED); 
else return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
3. send update_groupinfo(new.groupJnfo) request to servers Sp and Sq ;
4. groupJnfo.update(new.groupJnfo); /* update cache copies of groupJnfo */
5. return(ACK);
Figure 16: Scenario: Add user “a” to group A
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cache copy for read purposes only.
It is not difficult for some rogue process to gain write privileges to cache copies. 
Afterall, cache copies of groupJnfo and privJnfo on a host are owned by the server 
process on the host. By manipulating the server code, one could try to gain write 
privileges on these cache copies. This however should not affect the integrity of the 
original copy nor should it weaken the authentication/authorization process. The 
groupJnfo and privJnfo objects in the cache are used to speed up authentication and 
authorization. If a user is validated by the information in the cache, before the actual 
operation is effected, a cross-check is done by validating the user against the original 
copies of the groupJnfo and privJnfo objects. This works fine and does not add to 
network congestion since most operations have to make remote requests to effect a 
service. Authentication/authorization can be done during this connection with the 
remote server.
5.2 .7  M ultip le C lients on the sam e H ost
Consider the case where a hierarchy is opened and being used by a user on some 
host L and another user on the same host now issues a request to open the same 
hierarchy. Here, we can take advantage of the existence of the protection related 
information for the hierarchy on the local cache, rather than having to connect to 
the remote hierarchy for each new caller. As soon as a request to open a hierarchy 
reaches the local server, it checks to see if the protection information already exists in 
the cache. If it does, then the authentication/authorization need be done only on this 
host. On the event of a successful authorization, the local server has to connect to 
the remote database site to retrieve the hierarchy information. Note that we do not 
cache the hierarchy’s minJnfo  since there is no significant performance improvement 
in doing so. However, every time any EIS service is requested, we go through a process 
of authenticating/authorizing the user. Since groupJnfo and privJnfo are the objects 
encapsulating this process, we find it beneficial to cache these objects.
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Client C|_ Client CL2
Server S,
Server S,
1. Get_Hierarchy(uid, HIER, R);
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK then
/* Note down user-id and process id of all clients using HIER. */ 
HIER.ref_list.add(uid, pid);
3. Get_min_info(HIER);
4. if authorize(uid) = OK then  
re t urn(min Jnfo);
5. re t urn(min Jnfo);
Figure 17: Scenario: Multiple Clients on the same Host
Server S Server S
Close HierarchvfHIEm
1. Close_Hierarchy(HIER);
2. delete HIER.privJnfo; 
delete groupJnfo;
3. delete_site-from_list(L); /* asynchronous request
4. Sm ' groupJnfo.siteJist.delete(L);
Sr : HIER.privJnfo.siteJist.delete(L);
no reply */
Figure 18: Scenario: Close Hierarchy
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5 .2 .8  C lose H ierarchy
It is necessary and im portant to keep data in the cache only for as long as it is 
required. As long as an object is cached, every update operation on that object will 
have to be passed on to all the copies that exist out there on the network so as to 
maintain consistency among the copies. So when a user chooses to close an open 
hierarchy, we have to do a cache cleanup operation. The “close_hierarchy” request 
is forwarded6 to the local server S l • The local server deletes its copy of groupJnfo 
and privJnfo for the hierarchy and issues asynchronous requests to servers Sm  and 
S r  telling them that the copies of group-info and privJnfo  respectively are deleted. 
Servers Sm  and S r  then remove the host entry L from the site list that keeps track 
of the hosts maintaining a copy of the concerned information. However, in the event 
of multiple clients using the same hierarchy and hence the same data in the cache, 
it becomes necessary that we keep some sort of reference count to check the number 
of active clients referencing the cache information. In order to deal with this, the 
server is made to maintain a reference list to an opened hierarchy. The reference 
list keeps track of the process-ids of the processes that have opened the hierarchy 
along with a latest-use time-stamp. The time-stamp helps identify the last time the 
process made a service request for the hierarchy. The time-stamp also helps recover 
from situations where the client ptime-stamp also helps recover from situations where 
the client process dies abnormally.
5.3 C onsistency
Consistency is one of the key issues in a system where replication of data is being 
done. In EIS, the replicated information in the cache is writeable only by one process. 
The groupJnfo cache object is writeable only by the mainserver  process in the cell 
domain and the privJnfo cache object for a hierarchy is writeable only by the server
6The client need not wait for the return value of this request. It just closes the hierarchy window 
and issues an asynchronous one-way request to Sl
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where the hierarchy’s minJnfo  is stored. All clients on the local host can use these 
cache objects in read-only mode. These factors make consistency among these objects 
easier to implement. In this section, we shall verify consistency of a replicated object 
and that of a requested service by looking at some scenarios with the read/read, 
read/w rite issues into consideration. The write/write situation never occurs since the 
replicated objects are writeable only by the server that owns the original copy of the 
object.
In the read/read situation, we can think of two processes reading from its local 
copy of the object. This does not affect the integrity of the replicated objects and 
hence nothing need be done to ensure consistency.
Let us consider a read/write situation. This is a situation when an update opera­
tion is effected by some process on an object A and another process on some other host 
has already read its local copy of the object, A L, to perform some service before the 
update object request reaches object A L. In section 5.2.5 and 5.2.6, we discussed some 
example scenarios where an update operation needs to be propogated to all those 
servers where a cache copy of the concerned object exists. Let us look at another sce­
nario, “delete_user_from_group” , whose object diagram is exactly similar to that in 
the scenario in section 5.2.6. Let’s suppose that the user X@L, who belongs to group 
Gi, has the all the privileges that reside with G\. The group G\ is assumed to have 
delete rights to the hierarchy HIER. In this scenario, the “delete_user_from_group” 
request can be issued only by the EIS Administrator and hence the update groupJnfo 
request originates on the mainserver  of the cell. If the user X@L now requests the 
“delete_object” service to an object in HIER before the “update groupJnfo” request 
reaches the replicated object groupJn foL, then we have a consistency problem in 
the requested service. The user X@L passes the authentication/authorization test 
on the local copy of groupJnfo, groupJnfoL, even though he actually no longer is a 
user to the group G\ and hence cannot delete an object in the hierarchy. However, 
if we look back at the authentication mechanism used in EIS, we find that in the
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event of successful authentication of a  user against a local copy, a service requested 
is granted to the user only after authenticating him against the original copy of the 
groupware information. Hence in this scenario, the “delete_object” request has to be 
propogated to the mainserver  for authentication before the service is granted, thus 
ensuring consistency of the service.
We argued that a write/w rite situation never occurs. While this is true under 
normal circumstances, it is not impossible for a rogue to manipulate the replicated 
object on his host. In such a scenario, even though the consistency between the 
different copies of an object cannot be guaranteed, the validity of the original object 
and the services provided by another server are not compromised.
5.4 C lient crashes
As noted in the “Close Hierarchy” scenario, the life of data in a cache is de­
termined by the existence of clients using that information. The reference-list that 
maintains the process ids of all the client processes using a cache object helps de­
termine the processes still using a cache object. As soon as a client closes an open 
hierarchy, the process entry is removed from the reference-list. The data in the cache 
is physically removed when the last process entry is removed from the reference list. 
However, if a client process dies before closing an open hierarchy, then there is a 
reference to the process in the reference-list that will never be removed and the cache 
object would continue to live forever leading, to unnecessary network communication 
overhead whenever the cache needs to be updated. To solve this problem, the server 
that keeps a local copy is made to periodically look up the process table to find if 
every client process in the reference-list is still alive. If any client process was found 
to be no longer in the process table, then its entry is deleted from the reference list. 
This ensures that the copy exists in the cache only as long as it needs to be there.
6. Sum m ary and C onclusion
In Chapter 1, we discussed the need for a security mechanism for EIS that would 
provide a reliable authentication scheme and guarantee the coherence of the database 
against rogueish behaviour. Chapter 3 presents the design of the groupware layer 
for EIS. The groupware layer was designed using the object-oriented methedology. 
The design of a groupware layer for EIS was considerably different from that for 
a monolithic system. A detailed study of the organization of the different objects 
relevant to the groupware layer and how they fit into EIS were discussed in Chapter
3. When designing any network security mechanism, the most im portant concern is 
the way authentication is done. Only if we are able to identify correctly to whom we 
are talking, can we determine what access privileges that user can have. Chapter 4 
deals with a careful study of various popular authentication mechanisms such as that 
used in “rlogin” and “rsh”, ident and kerberos and presents a viable authentication 
mechanism for EIS. Chapter 4 also discusses the authorization and access control 
aspects of the groupware layer. Based on the design of the groupware layer presented 
in Chapters 3 and 4, a series of scenarios were presented in Chapter 5. The scenarios 
were a means of viewing different design issues and helped greatly in designing the 
right approach for implementation in EIS.
6.1 Im plem entation  Status
EIS 1.0 supports the groupware layer and is fully functional. The implementation 
follows the design discussed in this thesis. EIS is currently supported on IBM/RS6000 
workstations and runs on AIX 3.2. The code is written in C + +  and the client/server 
communication system is implemented using the SUN RPC 4.0. The code should 
be portable to a wide range of Unix workstations within the portability bounds of 
different C + +  compilers, X/M otif library implementations and the SUN RPC. EIS is 
presently populated with enough database information to illustrate both its use and 
its value to potential users.
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The groupJnfo object encapsulating the authentication information for users in a 
cell exists on the mainserver  of the cell. Since this is by far the most frequently used 
object in EIS, we use a shared memory implementation of the object thereby keeping 
it in shared memory on the mainserver  at all times. This helps speedier access 
to authentication and also eases coding the operations performed on the groupJnfo 
object. Also since there is only one groupJnfo object per cell, there are not too many 
shared memory segments kept floating in the machines.
6.2 D irections for Further Research
The implementation does not include the caching concept discussed in the scenar­
ios presented in Chapter 5. The goal , of the groupware design was to first design a 
security mechanism that was reliable and helped provide controlled access to the EIS 
database and then consider implementing features that improved the system perfor­
mance. The present implementation provides all the functional features necessary in 
a security system. Migrating from the present system to one including the caching 
concept should not affect the end-user in any way and the process is upward com­
patible. EIS is still in a rudimentary stage with a limited user community. As the 
number of users using EIS increases, the design details presented here should form 
the basis for a consideration of the finer design issues. The future designer can pay 
more attention to the caching concept and come up with a reliable coherence scheme 
for implementation in EIS. Another feature that could be very helpful is to design 
appropriate replication algorithms to replicate the EIS databases on multiple systems. 
As the user community grows across the network, making far and remote requests 
for database resourses could greatly reduce the performance. Replication algorithms 
help the end-user to connect to the nearest database server and hence speed up access 
times.
The present authentication mechanism does not use the more recent popular au­
thentication schemes such as kerberos and public key authentication. The ultim ate
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goal is to be able to use a DCE-based implementation of EIS to provide a reliable 
and robust security mechanism. As DCE gains popularity and becomes available on 
multiple platforms more easily, a port of EIS to a DCE-based implementation is most 
desirable. Newer versions of SUN RPC also claim to provide a more robust security 
mechanism. Also they should be freely available on many platforms. An upgrade 
of the present system to one using the newer version of SUN RPC might also help 
improving the authentication in EIS.
EIS 1.0 does not support any kind of recovery from server crashes. If a server 
servicing requests to an EIS database crashes, then that database remains unacces- 
sible until the server is restarted and starts functioning normally again. The future 
researcher could explore possibilities of implementing more graceful server recovery 
from crashes. One possible approach could be to keep a log of the current state of 
the server. Upon a server crash, the server could be initialized to the previous state 
as noted in the log and proceed from there. Another, more reliable apporach, could 
be to consider replication algorithms to replicate the EIS database so that there are 
more than just one server providing services to a database. Such a system not only 
speeds up access times by allowing the user to connect to the nearest database server, 
but also provides fault-tolerance.
A ppendix  A  
P seu d ocod e for A u th en ticatin g  a U ser
authenticate(user X) /* begin authentication for create group */ 
beg in
getpeername(socket_descriptor, &remote_host_address, &remote_port) 
if  (X.host-address != remoteJxost_address) th e n  
return(FA LSE); 
procJnfoJist =  getprocinfo(); 
w hile  (procJnfo != NULL) 
beg in
if procJnfo.program_name =  “e is” th e n
if procJnfo.userJd =  X .userJd th e n  
return(T R U E ); 
procJnfo =  procJnfoJist .next;
end
return(FA LSE);
en d
Figure 19: Authenticate User X
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A ppendix  B
Installation  G uide for EIS 
P rodu ct D escription
The Ecosystem Information System (EIS) is an object-oriented distributed system 
containing various types of information of interest to ecosystem modelers and man­
agers. EIS 1.0 is presently supported on the IBM RS6000s. Successful installation of 
EIS 1.0 on your system will require:
AIX XL C + +  1.1 or AIX C + +  Set 2.0 
X/M otif
ONC RPC 4.0 library
EIS comes in two parts: EIS client and EIS Server. EIS client can be used by the 
user to gain access to the EIS repository. EIS server runs as a daemon process on 
each active EIS host.
EIS can be downloaded in two ways:
1. If your system is an IBM RS6000 and your machine does not support any one 
or more of the above mentioned libraries, then you can download the executables in 
binary mode. The three files to download are
eis (The client executable)
eis_svc (The server executable) 
eisJnstall (The server installation script)
2. If your system supports the above libraries, then download “eis.tar.Z” into the 
directory where you want to install this software and execute the following commands.
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If you were in SOMEJDIR directory when you executed the above commands, 
there will be an “eis” directory created under it. This will be your EIS base directory 
(henceforth named as EISDIR) he. SOME-DIR/eis is the same as EISDIR. The 
directory structure within EISDIR is shown later in this section.
After the EISDIR have been created, the next step is to build all the executables 
required for the EIS system. In order to do this, go to the EISDIR directory, and 
execute the command:
% make all
This will build the following executables
EISDIR/d.clnt/eis (The client executable)
EISDIR/d.server/eis-svc (The server executable)
EISDIR/d.server/eisinstall (The server installation script)
In order to use EIS on your host, you will have to first install the server as a
daemon process, “eisinstall” is an installation script to install the server on your 
machine. The server on your machine has to know:
1) The path of the directory where the EIS database on this host exists. For 
example, you can specify EISDIR/d.data as the database path.
2) The EIS Main Server for this host. The Main Server is one that maintains 
a list of database sites and database hierarchies. An existing main server is: 
m eg g ers .c s .u m t.ed u . You could choose to name your host as your main 
server in which case the database will have nothing to start with. However you 
can connect to any of the other sites through the client interface.
3) The EIS administrator for this site. [ This is necessary only if you choose your 
site as the main server]. The person installing EIS is automatically chosen as 
the EIS administrator.
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Once you have made sure that the EIS Main Server and your local EIS Server 
are running, any user can access the database by running EISDIR/d.clnt/eis. It is 
advisable to include EISDIR/d.clnt in your PATH environment variable so that eis 
can be started just by typing “eis” .
R eferences
[1] R.Ford, R.Righter, T.Duce, V.Hemige, D.Thompson, “A Network-based Object- 
Oriented Ecosystem Information System,” Decision Support 2001 - Resource Tech. 
‘94 Symposium, Toronto, Canada, Sept. 94.
[2] R.Ford, R.Righter, T.Duce, V.Hemige, D.Thompson, “EIS: A Network-Accessible 
Repository for Ecosystem Modelers and Managers”, 10th Annual ACM Symposium 
on Applied Computing, Feb. 1995.
[3] R.Ford, R.Righter, T.Duce, V.Hemige, D.Thompson, “A Network-Accessible Repos­
itory for GIS and Natural Resource Data”, GIS Symposium on Natural Resources, 
Vancouver, Canada, Mar. 95.
[4] Grady Booch, Object Oriented Design with Applications, The Benjamin/Cummings 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1992
[5] John Bloomer, Power Programming with RPC, O’Reilly & Associates, Inc., 1992
[6] Harold Lokhart, OSF DCE: Guide to Developing Distributed Applications, J.Ranade 
Workstation Series, 1994.
[7] Andrew S. Tannenbaum, Distributed Operating Systems. Prentice Hall, 1995.
[8] Richard Stevens, Unix Network Programming, Prentice Hall, 1993.
[9] Peter Triantafillou, “The Location-Based Paradigm for Replication: Achieving Effi­
ciency and Availability in Distributed Systems”, IEEE transactions on Software Engi­
neering, Vol. 21, No. 1, Jan. 1995, pp 1-17.
[10] Robert Netzer, Jian Xu, “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Consistent Global 
Snapshots”, IEEE transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, Vol. 6, No. 2, Feb. 
1995, pp 165-169.
55
